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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sabina Hallam appeals from the district court’s judgment denying her post-conviction
petition. She argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing her petition because
one of her ineffective assistance of counsel claims for a breach of the plea agreement presented
genuine issues of material fact on deficient performance and prejudice. In fact, the district court
accepted Ms. Hallam’s allegations on deficiency as true, but failed to conduct any prejudice
analysis. If properly examined, Ms. Hallam met her burden to survive summary dismissal on her
breach of plea claim. Accordingly, Ms. Hallam respectfully submits that the Court should vacate
the district court’s judgment, reverse its summary dismissal order, and remand this case for an
evidentiary hearing on this claim.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case, the State charged Ms. Hallam with five counts of grand
theft. (R. Vol. I,1 p.192.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pled guilty to one count, and the other
four counts were dismissed. (R. Vol. I, p.192.) The guilty plea advisory form indicated that
Ms. Hallam was aware that she “may be required” to pay restitution, but the form was silent on
the restitution terms. (R. Vol. I, pp.62–68.)
At the change of plea hearing, neither the parties nor the district court recited the terms of
the plea agreement. (R. Vol. I, pp.112–120.) However, during the plea colloquy, the district court
asked Ms. Hallam if she understood that “restitution could be awarded on everything,” (R. Vol. I,
p.113 (Tr., p.2, Ls.15–16)), and that “restitution could be awarded on all the cases, even the ones
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being dismissed, (R. Vol. I, p.115 (Tr., p.4, Ls.10–11)), and Ms. Hallam said yes to both
questions, (R. Vol. I, pp.113, 115 (Tr., p.2, L.18, p.4, L.12)).
At sentencing, the prosecutor stated that “our negotiations” were that Ms. Hallam would
pay restitution on “all matters whether charged or uncharged or dismissed otherwise.” (R. Vol. I,
p.128 (Tr., p.7, Ls.12–21).) Ms. Hallam’s counsel did not refute the prosecutor’s statement. (R.
Vol. I, p.128 (Tr., p.7, L.25).)
The district court held a “contested” restitution hearing. (R. Vol. I, p.193.) Later, in the
district court’s memorandum decision and order on restitution, it noted that Ms. Hallam never
objected to “full” restitution as including the dismissed counts. (R. Vol. I, p.78.) Ms. Hallam’s
objections pertained to the amount only. (R. Vol. I, p.78.) The district court also noted that the
sentencing judge had stated in its order dismissing the other counts that Ms. Hallam “would be
‘responsible for all restitution attributable to such offenses.’” (R. Vol. I, p.78; see also R. Vol. I,
p.140.) In light of these facts, the district court opined, “The only reasonable inference based
upon this language as [sic] that the defendant had agreed to make reasonable restitution as to all
counts.” (R. Vol. I, p.78 n.1.) After reviewing the evidence from the restitution hearing, the
district court ordered Ms. Hallam to pay $30,787.00 in restitution. (R. Vol. I, p.83.)
Ms. Hallam appealed and, among other issues, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
for the restitution amount. (R. Vol. I, p.193; see also R. Vol. I, pp.72–76.) The Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentence and its restitution order.
(R. Vol. I, pp.69–76, 193.) See also State v. Hallam, Nos. 43035 & 43737, 2017 WL 491174
(Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).
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The clerk’s record has been divided into two volumes on appeal. The first volume contains 201
pages. The second volume contains eleven pages, and the second volume’s pagination begins
with page 202.
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Ms. Hallam filed a verified pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (R. Vol. I, pp.7–11.)
She raised five claims relating to the district court’s restitution order. (R. Vol. I, pp.7–11.)
Relevant here, she claimed: “(a)” her plea agreement “was not honored” and her attorney
“refus[ed] . . . to state this in court.” (R. Vol. I, p.7.) She also claimed: “(b)” her plea agreement
“was $1,700” for the charge that she pled guilty to, and the additional restitution “jumped to
$31,689” because of the four dismissed charges. (R. Vol. I, pp.7–8.) She also stated, “My
attorney failed to mention . . . that the restitution is not what was agreed on plea.” (R. Vol. I,
p.9.)
The State answered. (R. Vol. I, pp.12–15.) The district court appointed counsel to
represent Ms. Hallam. (R. Vol. I, pp.24–25.) Later, the State moved for summary dismissal,
arguing Ms. Hallam failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact or her claims were bare and
conclusory. (R. Vol. I, pp.52–53.)
Ms. Hallam responded in opposition. (R. Vol. I, pp.54–59, 60–61.) Ms. Hallam included
her guilty plea advisory form, the Court of Appeals’ opinion from the direct appeal, and the
district court’s memorandum decision and order on restitution. (R. Vol. I, pp.60–84.)
The district court held a hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal. (R. Vol. I,
pp.85–86; see Tr., p.1, L.1–p.14, L.14.) After brief argument by the parties, the district court
requested supplemental briefing on the prejudice prong and, specifically, whether Ms. Hallam
would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial, if not for her trial counsel’s
deficiency. (Tr., p.9, Ls.9–15, p.13, L.16–p.14, L.9.)
Ms. Hallam filed a supplemental brief and a declaration in support. (R. Vol. I, pp.89–90,
93–99.) Her declaration stated: (1) “At no point did my lawyer, the prosecutor, or the court
advise me that I would have to pay restitution in excess of one thousand five hundred dollars
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($1,500.00)”; (2) “At the time I pled guilty, I was told by my lawyer that I would only be liable
for restitution on a single count”; and (3) “I would not have pled guilty if I had known I would be
held accountable for restitution on all of the dismissed counts.” (R. Vol. I, p.89.)
The State responded. (R. Vol. I, pp.102–11.) The State asserted that Ms. Hallam was
“fully informed” at the entry of plea, sentencing, and restitution hearings and through the trial
court’s restitution decision that she would pay restitution on all counts. (R. Vol. I, pp.102–04,
105.) The State argued, since Ms. Hallam was told about restitution on all counts, her counsel
was not deficient and the record refuted her claim that she would not have pled guilty if she had
known about the restitution on all counts. (R. Vol. I, pp.104–11.) The State included transcripts
of the change of plea and sentencing hearings, as well as the trial court’s order dismissing the
remaining four counts. (R. Vol. I, pp.112–40.)
The district court held a short status conference and took the State’s motion under
advisement. (R. Vol. I, pp.146–47; Tr., p.15, L.1–p.19, L.23.)
About a month later, the district court issued an order granting the State’s motion for
summary dismissal. (R. Vol. I, pp.192–200.) The district court also took judicial notice of the
transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearings, the guilty plea advisory form, and the
district court’s memorandum decision and order on restitution. (R. Vol. I, pp.148–49.) In its
decision, the district court quoted Ms. Hallam’s first two claims from her petition:
(a) my agreement to a plea deal that was not honored and refusal of my attorney
to state this in Court;
(b) original 5 charges are $10,300 for restitution, 4 charges were dismissed, yet
after plea deal restitution jumped to $31,689 (plea agreement was $1,700) court
cost are on 4 dismissed cases. . . .
(R. Vol. I, p.193.) “In these claims [A and B],” the district court summarized, “Ms. Hallam
alleges that the restitution award entered by the Court greatly exceeded what was agreed upon by
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the parties in plea negotiations.” (R. Vol. I, p.196.) On deficient performance, the district court
ruled:
Here, Ms. Hallam has alleged that her trial counsel failed to alert the Court
that her plea deal was not honored and that trial counsel affirmatively advised her
that that she would only be liable for restitution on the single count to which she
pled guilty. Those allegations remain uncontroverted on the record currently
before the Court. The guilty plea advisory form is silent as to the amount of
restitution that could be ordered, and there is no written plea agreement before the
Court. Additionally, the State has not produced any evidence to controvert those
allegations.
“In considering summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction
relief, the trial court must accept as true verified allegations of fact in the
application or in supporting affidavits, no matter how incredible they may appear,
unless they have been disproved by other evidence in the record.” . . . Applying
that standard to the evidence in this case, this Court is bound to accept
Ms. Hallam’s allegations as true.
Those allegations create a question of fact as to whether trial counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Evaluating the
conduct at issue from counsel’s perspective at the time Ms. Hallam changed her
plea, it could be objectively deficient to advise Ms. Hallam that she would only be
liable for restitution on a single count when there was no binding plea agreement
between the parties and the Court and when the Court could lawfully impose
restitution for any economic loss which the victim actually suffered as a result of
Ms. Hallam’s conduct.2 This Court is not deciding that trial counsel’s
performance was deficient during the plea process. Rather, this Court finds that
under the standards articulated by our state’s appellate courts, Ms. Hallam has
created a genuine issue of material fact worthy of an evidentiary hearing on the
first prong of the Strickland test.
(R. Vol. I, pp.197–98 (citation omitted).) Although the district court found deficient
performance, the district court determined that Ms. Hallam was not prejudiced. (R. Vol. I,
pp.198–99.) The district court focused on whether Ms. Hallam would have pled guilty but for her
counsel’s errors. (R. Vol. I, p.198.) The district court discussed that the trial court had told
Ms. Hallam twice “that she could be liable for restitution on all counts, even though being

2

As discussed below, unless consented to by the parties, the district court cannot order
restitution for dismissed charges. I.C. § 19-5304(9).
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dismissed,” and she indicated that she understood, and she still pled guilty. (R. Vol. I, p.198.)
The district court reasoned:
A petitioner’s claims may be summarily dismissed if the allegations are plainly
disproven by the record. . . . The record in this case conclusively establishes that
Ms. Hallam fully understood that she could be liable for restitution on all counts
prior to entering her plea of guilty. The record demonstrates that the Court made
Ms. Hallam aware that she could be liable for restitution on all counts on at least
two occasions. At either of those points during the change of plea hearing Ms.
Hallam could have halted the proceeding to speak with counsel or simply elected
not to plead guilty and proceed to trial. This plainly disproves Ms. Hallam’s
allegation that she would not have pled guilty had she been aware that she could
be liable for restitution on all five counts. Because the record establishes that
Ms. Hallam fully understood that she could be liable for restitution and still pled
guilty, Ms. Hallam has failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact that she
was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficiency. Even assuming that Ms. Hallam
could demonstrate at an evidentiary hearing that her trial counsel was deficient,
there is no question that she was not prejudiced by that deficiency.
(R. Vol. I, p.199 (citation omitted). In conclusion, the district court dismissed “claims A and
B . . . as a matter of law.” (R., Vol. I, p.199.) The district court also rejected Ms. Hallam’s
remaining claims, which are not pursued here. (R. Vol. I, pp.199–200.)
On the same day, the district court entered a judgment denying Ms. Hallam’s petition
with prejudice. (R. Vol. II, p.202.) Ms. Hallam timely appealed. (R. Vol. II, pp.204–06.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Ms. Hallam’s petition for post-conviction
relief?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Hallam’s Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Ms. Hallam argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing her claim that

her counsel failed to object when the trial court went beyond the plea agreement terns and
ordered her to pay restitution for the dismissed charges. In dismissing this breach of plea claim,
the district court found that Ms. Hallam’s allegations were uncontroverted and that she
established genuine issues of material fact on deficiency, but the district court did not analyze the
prejudice prong. Instead, the district court only conducted a prejudice analysis on Ms. Hallam’s
related claim that her guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Because the district
court failed to examine prejudice on the breach of plea claim, and Ms. Hallam established
genuine issues of material fact on both Strickland prongs, the district court erred by summarily
dismissing this claim. As such, she respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court’s
judgment, reverse its order granting summarily dismissal on this claim, and remand this case for
an evidentiary hearing.

B.

Post-Conviction Jurisprudence & Standards Of Review
A petition for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361

(2013).
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief
must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the
application for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24
(2000). Unlike the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application
for post-conviction relief must contain more than “a short and plain statement of
the claim” that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, an
application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within
the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The application must
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include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must
state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970)). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must generally
show that (1) his attorney’s performance did not meet “an objective standard of reasonableness,”
and (2) his attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced him. Id. at 687–88. “Although Strickland
concerned an allegation of ineffective assistance in a sentencing proceeding, the same standard
applies equally to claims arising from the plea process.” McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850
(2004) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)).
The district court can summarily dismiss or grant a petition for post-conviction relief if
“there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). “In considering summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief, the trial court must accept as true verified allegations of fact in the
application or in supporting affidavits, no matter how incredible they may appear, unless they
have been disproved by other evidence in the record.” Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 909
(Ct. App. 1995). The district court is “required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as
true, but need not accept the petitioner’s conclusions.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Any
disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and “all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Vavold v. State, 148
Idaho 44, 45 (2009).
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A petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
will “survive a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of
fact exists as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact
exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced petitioner’s case.” Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583 (2000). If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted to resolve the factual issues. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2002).
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Because the evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does
not involve the finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only
determinations of law. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews a district court’s summary
dismissal order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402–03 (2006).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Hallam’s Breach Of Plea
Claim Because There Were Genuine Issues Of Material Fact On Deficiency And
Prejudice
As recognized by the district court, Ms. Hallam raised two claims related to her plea

agreement and restitution. (R. Vol. I, pp.196–97.) One claim pertained to her trial counsel’s
advice on the restitution terms of the plea agreement, but the other pertained to her counsel’s
failure to object when the trial court and the prosecution did not follow the agreement. (R., Vol.
I, p.197.) On this latter claim, the district court failed to conduct any prejudice analysis, despite
its determination that Ms. Hallam’s counsel was deficient. (See R. Vol. I, pp.198–99.) The
district court also misunderstood the relevant restitution standards, which skewed its Strickland
analysis for both claims. Because Mr. Hallam actually established genuine issues of material fact
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on deficiency and prejudice for her breach of plea claim, she met her burden to survive summary
dismissal. She maintains that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve these factual
disputes.
First, on deficient performance, Ms. Hallam met her burden to show that her counsel’s
failure to object and inform the trial court of the plea agreement’s restitution terms was
objectively unreasonable. Ms. Hallam averred that her plea agreement’s restitution term was that
she would pay $1,700 for the one grand theft charge that she pled guilty to. (R. Vol. I, pp.7–8.)
The district court found that Ms. Hallam’s allegations on the restitution terms of the plea
agreement remained “uncontroverted on the record” before it. (R. Vol. I, p.197.) The district
court recognized that the guilty plea advisory form was silent on the restitution amount
“that could be ordered,” and there was no written plea agreement provided to the district court.
(R. Vol. I, p.197.) The district court also noted that the State did not produce any evidence “to
controvert those allegations,” such as the written agreement or an affidavit from the prosecution
on the agreement’s terms. (R. Vol. I, p.197.) Accepting Ms. Hallam’s allegations as true, the
district court determined that Ms. Hallam met her burden to show that her counsel was deficient
in advising her “that she would only be liable for restitution on a single count when there was no
binding plea agreement between the parties and the Court and when the Court could lawfully
impose restitution for any economic loss which the victim actually suffered as a result of
Ms. Hallam’s conduct.” (R. Vol. I, pp.197–98.)
Although the district court incorrectly believed that Ms. Hallam could be liable to pay for
any economic loss, the district court still identified genuine issues of fact on deficient
performance that were material to Ms. Hallam’s breach of plea claim. The district court seemed
to believe that, without an express agreement, the default for restitution was that the trial court
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could “lawfully impose” restitution for any counts, even the dismissed ones. (R. Vol. I, pp.197–
98.) This is simply not the law. “The court may, with the consent of the parties, order restitution
to victims, and/or any other person or entity, for economic loss or injury for crimes which are not
adjudicated or are not before the court.” I.C. § 19-5304(9). “Thus, when a defendant has been
charged with multiple crimes and pleads guilty to part of the charges in exchange for dismissal of
the remainder, restitution is not ordinarily awardable for loss or injury actually and proximately
caused only by the offenses for which the charges were dismissed.” State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho
491, 495 (Ct. App. 2012); accord State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 886 (Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 372 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Hargis, 126 Idaho 727, 730 (Ct. App.
1995). Thus, the restitution default was that the trial court could only impose restitution for the
single grand theft charge that Ms. Hallam pled guilty to, unless the parties agreed otherwise. If
there was “no binding plea agreement” on restitution at all, as found uncontroverted by the
district court, or even if there was an express term for $1,700 in restitution on the pled-to charge,
the restitution default would apply: there was no agreement on the dismissed counts, and
Ms. Hallam “would only be liable for restitution on a single count . . . .” (R. Vol. I, pp.197–98.)
Either way, Ms. Hallam’s counsel performed deficiently. Her counsel’s failure to object to the
trial court’s interpretation of the plea agreement that Ms. Hallam was liable for restitution for the
dismissed counts at the change of plea hearing, or at any other time, was objectively
unreasonable.3 Taking Ms. Hallam’s allegations as true, and without any contrary evidence from
the State, (R., Vol. I, p.197), Ms. Hallam met her burden to establish genuine issues of material

3

This means that trial counsel was not necessarily deficient in advising Ms. Hallam that she
would only have to pay restitution on the one count. Taking Ms. Hallam’s allegations as true,
counsel was correct in this advice. The deficiency, therefore, was in counsel’s failure to correct
the trial court in its recitation of the plea agreement terms.
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fact on deficient performance for ineffective assistance of counsel on a breach of plea claim. See,
e.g., State v. Acuna, 154 Idaho 139, 142 (Ct. App. 2013) (“the state breached the plea agreement
by seeking restitution that the prosecutor had purported to waive in the plea agreement”); see cf.
Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 93 (Ct. App. 2006) (“[A] defense attorney’s failure to either inform
his client of the risk of a restitution order as a consequence of a contemplated guilty plea or to
object to the State’s request for restitution at or after sentencing when the defendant was not
previously informed of that consequence, may constitute deficient performance.”).
Second, on prejudice, Ms. Hallam met her burden to show that her counsel’s failure to
object to the breach of plea prejudiced her. On this prong, the district court erred by only
examining prejudice on one of the two claims. (R. Vol. I, pp.198–99.) The district court
determined, despite counsel’s deficiencies, Ms. Hallam did not meet her burden to show that she
would not have pled guilty but for her counsel’s error. (R. Vol. I, pp.198–99.) By relying on the
change of plea transcript and guilty plea advisory form, the district court reasoned, “The record
in this case conclusively establishes that Ms. Hallam fully understood that she could be liable for
restitution on all counts prior to entering her plea of guilty.” (R. Vol. I, p.199.) The district court
continued, “This plainly disproves Ms. Hallam’s allegation that she would not have pled guilty
had she been aware that she could be liable for restitution on all five counts.” (R. Vol. I, p.199.)
This analysis, however, also suffers from the same flawed premise as the deficiency analysis—
that the trial court could lawfully impose restitution on all counts, even the dismissed ones.
Under this faulty framework, even if the agreement was silent, Ms. Hallam was nonetheless
informed of the lawful restitution consequences of her guilty plea, so she failed to show her plea
was invalid. But, applying correct restitution standards, the trial court’s informing Ms. Hallam of
those actually unlawful consequences, based on Ms. Hallam’s uncontroverted allegations, was
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modification of the plea agreement and resulted in a breach. This demands a separate prejudice
analysis than for an invalid guilty plea.
For a breach of plea claim, the inquiry is whether counsel’s objection on this basis would
have been sustained.
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney’s failure to pursue a
motion in the underlying criminal action, the district court may consider the
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the
attorney’s inactivity constituted incompetent performance. Boman v. State, 129
Idaho 520, 526 (Ct. App. 1996). Where the alleged deficiency is counsel’s failure
to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been
granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the
Strickland test. Id.
Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 477–78 (Ct. App. 2008). For example, in Hayes, the Court of
Appeals held that the petitioner made “a prima facie showing of prejudice from counsel’s failure
to object on the appropriate ground when the State requested restitution at the sentencing
hearing.” 143 Idaho at 93–94. There, the petitioner alleged that he was not informed “of the
prospect of restitution” before his guilty plea, and the Court of Appeals reasoned, if that were
true, “an objection by counsel to the restitution request should have been sustained.” Id. at 94.
The petitioner’s counsel had “objected to the amount of the State’s restitution request” and
argued an inability to pay, “but counsel did not object that [the petitioner] was not subject to
restitution at all because he had not been advised of this direct consequence of his guilty plea.”
Id. “Thus,” the Court of Appeals concluded, “if [the petitioner’s] evidence proves this deficient
performance, then his prejudice may be established by the fact the restitution order was entered.”
Id.
Here, if Ms. Hallam’s allegations are taken as true, she made a prima facie showing of
prejudice in her counsel’s failure to object to the breach of the plea agreement. In other words,
but for her counsel’s inactivity in pursing that objection, the trial court would not have ordered
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her to pay restitution for the dismissed counts. See id. Therefore, Ms. Hallam met her burden to
establish genuine issues of material fact on prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel on a
breach of plea claim.
In summary, Ms. Hallam alleged that her counsel failed to inform the trial court about the
restitution terms of her plea agreement and failed to object when the trial court did not follow
those terms. (R. Vol. I, pp.7–8, 9.) Without any evidence to the contrary, the district court
accepted Ms. Hallam’s allegations as true. Yet, the district court did not properly analyze her
breach of plea claim. On deficiency, Ms. Hallam’s allegations established genuine issues of a
material fact on the restitution terms of the plea agreement and whether it was accurately stated
on the record.4 On prejudice, these allegations established genuine issues of material fact on
whether Ms. Hallam would have been ordered to pay restitution on the dismissed counts but for
her counsel’s error. The district court did not address the prejudice prong of this claim at all and
misunderstood the restitution standards on the deficiency prong. Due to the genuine issues of
material fact, Ms. Hallam met her burden to survive summarily dismissal. The district court
should have held an evidentiary hearing on this breach of plea claim.

4

See Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 496 (“When a plea is offered pursuant to a plea agreement, “the
court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing
of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered.” I.C.R. 11(f)(2). Full disclosure of the
plea agreement on the record is necessary because, among other reasons, “[i]t is impossible for a
trial judge to properly administer a plea agreement if it consists of secret terms known only to the
parties.” Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986). If a plea agreement has not
been reduced to writing, ‘it is incumbent upon the attorneys to state the agreement in its entirety
on the record, and in a clear and coherent manner.’ State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 575 (Ct.
App. 1993); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 914 (Ct. App. 1985).”).
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Hallam respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s judgment, reverse
its order granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal on her breach of plea claim, and
remand this case for an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
DATED this 24th day of May, 2021.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of May, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

JCS/eas

16

